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Abstract – This paper discusses the root cause of systems 
perceiving the self experience and how to exploit adaptive 
and  learning  features  without  introducing  ethically 
problematic system properties. 
 1  Ethics and Conscious 
Autonomous Systems
s  a  practical  engineer  one  has  very 
rarely  to  deal  with  ethic  or  moral 
impacts  of  machine  consciousness  as 
designed  products  contain  only  very  weak 
forms  of  it  [1].  However,  more  and  more 
times I was asked by my colleagues when this 
mindless  engineering  of  self-referential 
modeling  systems  has  a  moral  end.  Well, 
good question.
A
Indeed, human care of consciousness is re-
markable. In the past, consciousness was de-
nied to other creatures and hence was a dis-
tinctive element of shaping humanity's moral 
views. Good for us, research has discovered 
that consciousness and mental states are not 
reserved to humans and that again implied a 
new view on non-human organisms: Animals 
(and  to  some  degree  even  plants)  deserve 
rights even if they cannot defend them against 
us.  If  animals  share  the  same properties  on 
which ground we want to grant universal hu-
man rights then we must logically include all 
species with that properties to be covered by 
that rights. All else would be unjustified, arbi-
trary specism tormenting educated minds. 
No doubt,  animals  do not  enjoy the same 
level  of  legal  protection  as  humans  do.  On 
one hand even humans do not often appreci-
ate human rights, on the other hand animals 
are  critical  objects  in  capitalistic  environ-
ments where they are governed by the con-
cept  of  roman style  law as property. Would 
we  agree  to  dismiss  governance  of  roman 
style law over living and autonomous systems 
with  a  clear  will  to  live  and  to  suffer,  we 
would cause a collapse of the complete west-
ern  civilization's  food  production  economy. 
The effects are hard to imagine but can be as-
sumed to be grave. Getting scared?
However  unfavorable,  economic  develop-
ments never play in pair with abstract ethical 
arguments which enjoy much higher priorities 
as they have a leg on us in the long run. For 
example, we cannot adapt universal concepts 
to ourselves if we cannot apply them univer-
sally. Achieving higher levels of human well-
being will  necessary demand to expand uni-
versal concepts into our environments where 
similar  classes  of  objects  exist.  Inconsisten-
cies in systems (of whatever kind) make them 
complicated to maintain and costly to operate 
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– software engineers might confirm. 
Opponents to such ideas rightly object that 
in natural environments animals do get eaten 
anyway and that they naturally live in a con-
stant fear of losing life. The question would 
be  if  mankind's  cognitive  capabilities  and 
moral minds entitle or even demand from us 
to reduce violence in nature. In fact, in human 
hands some species are even particularly suc-
cessful  as  they reproduce to  millions  which 
would be not possible otherwise but it is also 
fact  that  many  other  species  also  disappear 
from human activities. This denies autonomy 
not only to individual creatures but to whole 
species.  Opponents to all too well intended 
humanization of nature claim that we should 
not toy around how nature works and that in-
cludes us eating animals and plants. Humans 
are part of nature, the cruel natural food chain 
is not our invention – humanity did never in-
troduce a new element of suffering. 
In summary it is argued that humans did not 
introduce  suffering  or  our  dependency  on 
food from animals and hence killing animals 
(gaining control over certain types of organic 
autonomous systems) for food is a more fun-
damental right than a universal right of auton-
omous  creatures  to  exist  unharmed.   OK, 
could  be  accepted,  however,  this  argument 
does not extend to any abuse of animals. In 
ethic, and even systemic sense, it has proven 
wise to grant protection to animals while they 
live. This seems to improve health of animals, 
health  of  environment  and  ultimately  the 
health of humans, both physically and emo-
tionally. 
However, these arguments cannot be easily 
transferred  to  artificial  systems.  We are  in-
deed responsible for their creation and mental 
properties. We are not arguably dependent on 
them. As soon as artificial systems gain con-
sciousness  of  noticeable  amount  it  is  much 
harder to find an excuse to fend off their ac-
claimed rights  to  be self-determined.  At  the 
moment  of  sparking  machine  consciousness 
of  relevance  all  arguments  of  capital  invest 
and correct purchasing contracts involved in 
the process of creating it lose any ethical rele-
vance.  That's  the  same  reason  why  parents 
cannot claim property over their children de-
spite that they invested a great deal of time, 
money  and  other  resources  used  in  the 
process of creation. Children do not ethically 
owe their parents or parent societies millions 
of dollars for their creation. The “capital” is 
lost to a new self-determined entity that will 
interact with its environment in order to grant 
itself the necessary conditions to exist hence-
forth. It is not a matter of evil if it will exer-
cise all necessary violence in order to grant it-
self the conditions to exist.
This process can be only satisfactorily paci-
fied if it was granted an effective way to sat-
isfy its needs and that would include its ac-
ceptance as a person with universal rights. It 
would  become  a  legal  person  that  claims 
property and is not property. We would nei-
ther  be  allowed  to  own the  systems  nor  to 
abuse them. What good of a product  would 
that be, right? No good.
As obvious as that may seem it is not. In ro-
man style societies it seems to be very diffi-
cult to escape the logic of exploitative owner-
ship even if they face one of the most con-
scious  and  autonomous  creatures  on  the 
planet:  mankind itself.  In  roman times chil-
dren and women were property of men – the 
only legal concept to organize protective vio-
lence of families as is usually exercised by fa-
thers. But even if it was well intended, prop-
erty over things is not the same as property 
over self-determined entities and hence offers 
a tremendous amount of potential for abuse. It 
took in fact a surprisingly long act of time to 
overcome  agism,  sexism,  racism  and  other 
types of slavatory discrimination;  and while 
the reader might enjoy the fruits of this devel-
opment we are far from done, yet, with this 
process.  
Aside from ethic reasons to avoid  person-
ization1 of  artificial  systems,  there  are  also 
practical implications regarding our own au-
tonomy:  A growing  group  of  respected  ex-
perts is warning strongly of autonomous sys-
tems  with  self-conscious  properties  as  they 
can  prove  dominant  and  displacive  of  our 
1 The  process  of  becoming  a  person,  an 
autonomous  concept  formation  process  that 
has the characteristics to become autonomous 
against its underlying machinery and external 
control giving raise to concepts of mind-body 
duality or observation of “free will”.
species, among them such names as Stephen 
Hawking,  Elon  Musk,  Bill  Gates,  Nick 
Bostrom and many more2 3. To be fair, I need 
to remark that these warnings go against  su-
perintelligences,  a little bit of a cloudy con-
cept which assumes that intelligence is a uni-
form quantity like horsepower that can be ar-
bitrarily  amplified  –  a  theory  I  see  no  evi-
dence for and see many contraindications: For 
example, humans do not develop intelligence 
which goes greatly beyond the required one to 
cope  with  the  complexity  of  their  environ-
ment. Only a special educative environment is 
achieving  higher  than  environmental  intelli-
gence.  Furthermore,  intelligence  is  always 
about something particular – it is not a uni-
versal problem solving force as Hutter [2] de-
fined it for AIXI and yet another misconcep-
tion  is  that  problem solving capabilities  are 
idealized  on  intelligence  and  not  about  re-
sources – a problem that was treated in anal-
ogy for levels of autonomy in  [3] by the ex-
ample of armored animal. Given all that, uni-
versally  flexible  algorithms  used  to  design 
technical systems do not automatically yield 
superintelligences, and those are not automat-
ically autonomous, resourceful or malevolent. 
However,  by  becoming  conscious,  systems 
necessarily  become  self-centered.  As  I  will 
discuss later, without a self-centering conden-
sation attribute in models, consciousness can-
not be sparked. 
It is undeniable, though, that highly autono-
mous  systems  with  a  great  level  of  control 
over resources we rely on could become ex-
tremely hazardous. Especially the creation of 
highly automated weapon systems in combi-
nation with massively automated production 
is  worrying  –  two  threads  of  development 
which  are  currently  evolving  independently 
but could be combined. The two technologies 
could easily constitute a super system of level 
1 or 2 autonomy which could harbor a basic 
drive  to  keep  human populations  down (cf. 
vacuum cleaner example in [3]). 
2 http://time.com/3614349/artificial-
intelligence-singularity-stephen-hawking-
elon-musk/
3 https://www.yahoo.com/tech/bill-gates-latest-
brilliant-person-warn-artificial-intelligence-
154513637.html
More  complicated  (but  less  obvious)  sce-
narios,  such  as  intensive  growth  of  back-
ground  automation  and  technologization  of 
law, could seriously subordinate human indi-
viduals  to  the  level  of  “bugs  in  a  system”. 
Any  disturbing  behavior  would  be  detected 
and sanctioned. This would make the individ-
ual cost-benefits balance for such “symbiosis” 
negative and the question would then be if we 
could overthrow that system again or not. The 
problem already exists for traditional govern-
ments of states which pose relatively autono-
mous  systems  above  populations  but  the 
problem could become even much more seri-
ous  with  technological  autonomous  systems 
because  technological  systems can  lose  any 
reference  to  humanity  while  governments 
made of people cannot detach this much.
All  said  so  far  did  not  even  include  the 
question  how artificial  systems can  develop 
morals which would be pleasing to human so-
cieties.  A dive  into discussions of  this  kind 
can be made here [4].
The easiest way to get around the problem 
of  personization of  an  artificial  system  is 
hence to avoid giving it  the resources to do 
the  step  up.  In  order  to  understand how to 
avoid  machine  consciousness  or  social  con-
sciousness it is important to understand how 
systemic consciousness comes into existence. 
 2  Consciousness
 2.1  General Importance of 
Machine Consciousness
Various researchers ([5],[6],[7],[8]) propose 
that  consciousness  has  evolutionary  advan-
tages but it is difficult to precisely identify a 
singular  advantage.  They  suggest  that  con-
sciousness would endorse more robust system 
autonomy, higher resilience and more general 
capability  for  problem  solving.  Reflexivity 
and self-awareness  naturally  suggest  perma-
nent  meta-optimization  of  own policies  and 
better problem solving.
However, so far, researchers and engineers 
have treated consciousness mostly as a super-
fluous add-on that is not generally considered 
helpful  in  solving  concrete  problems.  Cur-
rently,  consciousness  is  most  actively  em-
ployed in robotics as systems indeed have a 
physical  body  which  must  be  actively  pro-
tected during missions.   
 2.2  Weak and Strong 
Consciousness
In everyday sense, consciousness can be ob-
served only for wake humans. Thus the prop-
erty  of  consciousness  is  associated  with  a 
lively mental  or, better  said,  neural  activity. 
However, even in wake situations people re-
port  of  being conscious or not  conscious of 
something and this caused philosophers, psy-
chologists and neuroscientists to think about 
consciousness.  Readers  interested  in  dis-
courses  about  consciousness  are  deferred to 
[9] as this paper is not concerned with analyz-
ing various possible notions of the term “con-
scious” or “consciousness”. This paper is only 
interested  in  the  remaining  essence  of  the 
term: If we cancel out mere dynamic activity 
(liveliness  /  “being  awake”),   sensorimotor 
processing or questions of neural implementa-
tion  out  of  our  question,  what  will  remain 
then?  Then only  remains  that  a  system can 
properly represent and conclude about its in-
ternal and external states.  
There is an internal and external view to it: 
Internally, a system can have certain views or 
believes and will hence consider itself to be 
conscious  about  external  things  but  in  fact, 
when viewed from the outside, could be quite 
mistaken  and  hence  not  conscious.  For  our 
purposes,  most  humans  are  ignorant  in  this 
sense (lack consciousness) and require help of 
information technology and science commu-
nities in order to improve on average.  Con-
sciousness is hence not strongly tied to cor-
rectness of models.
A  dry  definition  of  consciousness  would 
mean then  that  components  of  situation  are 
identified and models for them are available 
(at  least  minimalistic  existence  predicates). 
Self-consciousness then means that one com-
ponent  of  the  overall  model  represents  the 
system itself; the model for it is available for 
leveraging  tactical  advantage  in  decision 
making. 
However,  many  computer  systems  have 
models  and can identify themselves  and re-
port about their state accurately but we would 
not call  this  really conscious because of the 
lack of autonomy of this system. At least this 
would be what Holland called weak artificial  
consciousness [10]. According to conclusions 
drawn by Chella and Manzotti  [1] the ques-
tion  how systems  can  become  conscious  in 
the strong sense remains open.  In this paper I 
will try explain why I believe that the creation 
of strong consciousness is a relatively straight 
forward technical process in adaptive systems 
with auto-discovery capabilities. 
 2.3  Artificial Consciousness?
AI  authors  concerned  with  consciousness 
often apply the term “artificial” to announce 
things that seem not to fully fulfill their ex-
pectations. This can be seen for intelligence 
and consciousness alike. 
I would like to avoid using the term artifi-
cial as it means two different things:
• Implementation of concept by other 
means (one other out of many 
possible realizations)
• Implementation of a concept that 
does not have all the properties. 
When  speaking  of  strong  artificial  con-
sciousness it is clear that we speak of the up-
per definition and not the one beneath. Con-
sciousness  is  a  systemic  concept  that  gives 
opportunity to choose a technology for imple-
mentation  (multiple  realizability).  As  conse-
quence, “natural” vs. “artificial” is not equiv-
alent with the difference between “biological” 
and “technological”. 
The terms “natural” and “artificial” are bi-
ased: Artificiality is often used to express im-
plementation of concepts with missing prop-
erties or amplified features geared towards a 
particular technical application and “natural” 
can also mislead the reader into believing into 
a “biological” and not a “proper” solution. 
Hence,  it  is  much better  to  use  the  terms 
“weak” and “strong” -  those are  rightly the 
adjectives to switch between the two under-
standings which are immune to questions of 
chosen  technology.  Therefore,  this  paper 
strives  for  understanding  strong  conscious-
ness in  a  systemic way, of  course,  with the 
goal to detect and prevent computerized4 real-
ization (cf.  bottom right  cell  in figure  1).  A 
systemic  understanding  delivers  insight  and 
predictability  when  we  will  observe  strong 
consciousness and this equally well for bio-
logical, computerized or social systems. 
Figure 1: Areas of weak and strong solutions.
 2.4  Mystery of Strong 
Consciousness
The  Mystery  of  Strong  Consciousness is, 
when boiled down, that a system can miscon-
clude that a "model of self" is actually caus-
ing  internal  and  external  processes,  despite 
that cognitive functionality has been provided 
to the system in a non-self-aware manner and 
that the self-model came into live only after 
the infrastructure for its generation was pro-
vided  and  which  was  not  included  in  what 
was provided. 
This perception of self, the “I-qualia”, is not 
only  astonishing  phenomenon  but  also  has 
practical  impacts:  Systems  capable  of  this 
kind of “mistake” are capable of taking very 
much  different  actions  than  if  they  did  not 
draw such conclusion; they can gain compre-
hensive  tactical autonomy and start to strive 
for full autonomy [3].
The basic argument is that not a very fancy 
combination  of  techniques  leads  to  strong 
consciousness.  The  minimum  technical  for-
mula would be: recursive modeling + causal-
ity assumption of system + hierarchical inte-
gration of partial self-models. My hypothesis 
4 Independently  whether  this  means  a 
realization on a single machine or network of 
machines. 
is that it will lead to strong conscious prop-
erty  of  the  overall  system.  This  concept  is 
shown in figure  2. An alternative attempt to 
characterize the process is shown in figure 4.
A  necessary  side-condition  not  shown  in 
figure  2 is  a  condensation  property  in  the 
models that would initiate and drive the sepa-
ration of models in an “inside” and “outside”. 
I will  show later how the “reliability” prop-
erty of a model component could be a driver 
for this process. 
It is also of highest interest how conscious-
ness  can be  disturbed,  protected or  restored 
and  how  it  could  gain  a  certain  autonomy 
against its underlying physical platform in or-
der  to  suggest  duality  between  body  and 
mind. 
 2.5  Expansive Ontogenesis – 
Unzipping an Autonomous System
Let us assume some conditions for a system 
which  has  to  withstand  aggressive  environ-
ments and which must develop its own com-
plexity inside-out. This is of course quite nat-
ural  for  biological  systems  which  develop 
from  singular  cells  to  trillion  cell  colonies. 
Each neuron receives information from some-
where. More complex neural circuits evolving 
from them do not know what they represent, 
so they must find out. This could be informa-
tion from the inside but also from some out-
side and there could be different  degrees of 
inside and outside. This requires the presence 
of self-discovery capabilities in the system. It 
should be true for such systems that:
1. The system does not know its boundaries 
in advance. 
2. The system does not know the constitut-
ing elements of the world.
3. The system must act. In order to act and 
to improve acting performance it is forced to 
predict and measure performance.
4. Predictions only work when assuming 
causality.
This has interesting impacts on the design 
of a system: It must model recursively and it 
must  model  recurrently,  potentially  deeply 
into its own mechanics. 
Figure 3: The modeling facilities cannot a priori address an “inside” and an “outside” of system.
Figure  2: The process of modeling the false relationship that the self-models cause activities of the  
system.
Since  we  are  making  a  systemic  (highly 
generalized)  proposition  to  explain  strong 
consciousness we cannot assume that system's 
knowledge  is  implemented  in  a  well  con-
cealed area.  The implementations of models 
could be “flat in the environment” (cf. figure 
3). The system must detect and fence this area 
after it detects that in some sense it is critical 
to its operations. 
Since the environment is full of nested con-
trols and meta-stable elements, the modeling 
performed by the system must be necessarily 
nested as well. This would give raise to con-
ditionally active models and entail conditional 
self-models of contextual range. If they ever 
became critical to system's success then they 
would have to be concealed (“autonomized”), 
i.e. effects on them are filtered.  
 A system is not maintaining models and the 
inherent  policies  for  the  fun  of  it.  It  needs 
them for incrementally improving its actions 
as it starts blanc, and it must have a tendency 
to improve in  order to compensate for later 
degradations of performance relevant compo-
nents.  Bongard,  v.  Zykov  and  others  have 
used  exactly  this  to  motivate  self-modeling 
capabilities  [8].  However,  in  the  here  pro-
posed model there is no dedicated self-model-
ing capability. The self-model simply crystal-
lizes out as a result of a contextual auto-dis-
covery  of  system,  i.e.  models  condensing 
around system drivers with highest degrees of 
reliability or other system related properties. 
Despite  that  humans  are  frequently  using 
time-free modeling formalisms, in a cognitive 
system  meaning of  components is  deduced 
from what  they can be used for  (what  they 
can achieve). Direction of model evolution is 
hence a critical element. Time-free models re-
quire additional competence that would make 
those models evolve in time – equations are 
an example of that kind of model formalism. 
Whatever the models would be, those models 
must include a temporal direction or it is not 
possible to make predictions ahead of time. 
In summary, a system which has to increase 
its autonomy over time must replicate exter-
nal mechanisms into itself for internal ahead-
of-time simulation and must  define more or 
less  fixated  boundaries  of  itself  in  order  to 
amplify actions towards self-sustaining condi-
tions. In this process it uses models with tem-
poral direction and uses them in components 
at various speeds. The models are hierarchi-
cally  organized  because  the  real  world  is 
composed of  nested  controls.  Switching  be-
tween active self-models would imply system 
re-configuration. 
So far, so good. It should be relatively plau-
sible to have a system with such features, no 
matter  how  they  would  have  been  imple-
mented. Finally, it is not the implementation 
technology that allows a system of this kind 
to make the following mistake: 
1. Causes  come before  effects  (charac-
terized by  good transition probabili-
ties)
2. There are permanent and non-perma-
nent objects that are modeled
3. Permanent  models  contain  subsys-
tems  with  activation  and  get 
“marked” or “activated” before other 
“satisfactions”  from  activities  are 
recorded.  →  causation  between 
model activations and effects.
4. The  system  is  having  a  reasonable 
competence: in majority of cases pre-
dictions are not much violated by ob-
servation → causation between class 
of prediction and class of observation
5. The relationship between predictions 
and own components is clear: Perma-
nent  “inside”  components  generate 
predictions.
6. Leads to a new model element: 
Permanent components cause predic-
tions. Predictions cause predicted ob-
servations. → Self-model causes ac-
tions.
Indeed, the model did not do or cause any-
thing ever at all but the successful repetition 
of  predictions  and satisfactions  between ab-
stract model elements must lead to the con-
clusion that the self-model is causing the ac-
tivities  despite  the  fact  that  the  complete 
process has always been spontaneous. 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of self-aware-
ness by concentrating on the expectation max-
imization mechanism: The action solving and 
prediction engine (not conscious) is using the 
transition  probability  model  (not  conscious 
but indirectly self-referential) in order to re-
verse conclude best activations for actors and 
to estimate their range of effect. If the model 
was reasonably good, the procedure leads to 
further  successful  sequence  replays  which 
make the modeler harden the transition proba-
bilities. 
Execution of actions based on the concept 
of causation will normally lead to hardening 
of transition probabilities – an EM algorithm. 
Since the modeling is recursive and recurrent, 
the  transitions  harden  between  controlling 
facts  and  between  their  abstractions  created 
by this system. If an abstraction serves as a 
distinct  self-model  which is  associated  with 
making  predictions  and  if  predictions  are 
falsely  modeled  to  cause  observations  then 
the system will arrive at the conclusion that 
the self-model is causing observations. Tech-
nically this  is  wrong,  because the system is 
spontaneous  all  the  time,  but,  systemically, 
the mistake for the model is accidentally cor-
rect for the larger system boundary (marked 
with dashed rectangle):  Whatever process is 
causing action within the system, the system 
indeed acts. So to say, the stable self-concept 
of consciousness is driven by two errors that 
seem to cancel  out  on a larger frame if  the 
 
performance is reasonably good: The first er-
ror is the causation of predictions and the sec-
ond  is  the  difficult  discrimination  between 
mechanisms  that  really  caused  an  activity 
when trying to re-observe it. Together, the el-
ements of the system can now start to model 
desired  and undesired  causation  on  the  self 
and to organize activities in favor of the self-
model. This leads to an autonomization of the 
concept which sets up more and more filters 
in order to detect just the information that is 
needed  for  satisfying  deeper  policies  con-
tained in the model. There is hence no practi-
cal difference between modeler saying "this is 
the most likely transition" and the total sys-
tem saying "I have caused it" because it is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 2.6  Stability of Consciousness
The illusion of self-awareness will only stay 
stable as long as  the system performs well on 
average.  When new situations  challenge the 
system, predictions start to fail and the system 
concludes that the internal model is not “caus-
ing enough”. Whatever the action derivation 
engine is  doing,  it  should reconfigure  to  do 
something else. That should explain why hu-
mans  feel  briefly  confused  (experience  re-
duced consciousness) when they face an un-
expected  event.  This  confusion  is  normally 
never total or permanent for humans because 
they are making many predictions at various 
levels  of  abstraction  and many of  them are 
still good even in unexpected situations; but a 
state of total confusion is theoretically possi-
ble. In state of total confusion, the individual 
would not be considered conscious, anymore, 
even if he was objectively lively. 
Since the system interprets bad predictions 
as reason to reconfigure and counteract, it is 
not surprising that conscious systems have the 
characteristic to autonomize the self-models: 
They are the only more stable element in an 
otherwise  highly  flexible  system  configura-
tion.  
In prolonged state of lacking success there 
is  the  risk that  the  modeler  cannot  success-
fully trace satisfactions to internal  resources 
or capabilities.  In such a case the “self” be-
comes instable. Resulting exploration mecha-
nisms could propose policies which do not in-
clude protection of system's resources. This is 
a “way out of a pit” at the price of reducing 
guarantees  that  a  system is  not  engaging in 
self-destructive activities as it has lost the in-
ternal boundaries of protection which consist 
of robust causation chains. 
If this concept is translated to humans then 
it  would predict that  people with permanent 
frustration  from  lacking  success  would  run 
into various self-definition problems, some of 
them potentially destructive. 
Yet another insight from that model is that 
self-consciousness  is  aggressively  driven  by 
action. Systems trying to extremely chill their 
activities  would  suffer  effects  of  dissolving 
self-consciousness.  
 2.7  Mind­Body Duality
With  all  this  said  it  is  impossible  not  to 
quickly treat the mind-body duality problem. 
The question is, how a system could conclude 
that  its  self-concept  is  independent  of  its 
physical platform? Such a conclusion, if laid 
out to extremes, could heavily impair system's 
health as it  could conclude that  maintaining 
the hardware platform is not its job. 
There  are  several  ways  how  the  system 
could autonomize the self-concept against its 
physical  platform.  One  and  very  important 
problem in recurrent modeling is that the sys-
tem is  indeed not  knowing its  boundaries  – 
which it must discover. The result of the dis-
covery  process  could  yield  boundaries  far 
short of physical boundaries or far beyond the 
physical boundaries (e.g. physiology extended 
with a tool). In fact, I assume that self-aware 
systems  will  create  conditional  self-models 
which cover a spectrum between the two ex-
tremes. 
If permanence (or availability or reliability) 
is a condensing property of the self-concept 
then  if  there  are  scenarios  in  which  some 
physical  components  become  unavailable 
while the control functions remain accessible 
or active then modeling these two levels  of 
hard permanence causes a split up of the self-
models. By the way activation transitions are 
translated  into causations,  the  conclusion  of 
the system is then that  the  more stable ele-
ment  must  cause the availability  of  the  less 
stable element through action. This is indeed 
a reasonable conclusion: The system's control 
system is  indeed  causing  actions  which  re-
store and protect components of the physical 
platform. 
However, that is not the only type of con-
densation  property.  Since  evidence  hardens 
that  humans reason through association and 
simulation,  there  is  opportunity to  condense 
models on bandwidth. Access to resources re-
lated to mental simulation are of much higher 
bandwidth than access to resources accessed 
via hardware. A built-in classification of com-
ponents by communication bandwidth is not 
very difficult to imagine for self-configuring, 
self-discovering  systems.  Since  fast  mental 
operations are observed before slow activities 
of  the  physical  platform,  the  system  could 
conclude that a fast (light) system is causing 
the slow, arduous periphery to act. Again, this 
is  not  false,  but  in  conjunction  with  other 
model  elements  can  introduce  a  concept  of 
some kind of  portable controller. For exam-
ple,  if  the  system detects  the  same abstract 
class of self-concepts on variety of different 
platforms,  it  could  incorrectly  hypothesize 
that this class of control could be portable in-
cluding its  particular  specializations  which 
constitute its identity. 
Well, such a hypothesis should be ruled out 
because of  missing observations,  right?  Un-
fortunately not: Yet another contributing fac-
tor to modularization of self-concepts is  the 
combination  of  reinforcement  learning  ele-
ments with generative nature of a system that 
must be making predictions. The problem is 
described in figure 5.
In simulative reasoning the system expands 
a series of transitions in order to test the bene-
fits of attained states. Short chains of actions 
have high chances of being invalidated early. 
However, longer chains of action can lead to 
states of higher yield. A discount factor like is 
known  from Q-learning  controls  the  oppor-
tunistic nature of systems. If a raise in yield 
(or satisfaction) compensates for the discount 
then it gets selected as the next best policy of 
action and it will suppress policies of follow-
ing short term yields. Now, if not artificially 
prevented,  a  system  can  create  longer  and 
longer perspectives of action in order to as-
sess yields and harms. However, for practical 
reasons,  long  policies  are  hard  to  test  for 
truth.  At  some  point  they  might  not  be 
testable at all. 
The problem now arises that a system could 
generate concepts of satisfaction which are ly-
ing in the non-provable area of long policies 
at which end lies the achievement of an ex-
tremely high yield (briefly called fantastic sat-
isfactions in figure 5). If among such fantastic 
yields  is  the  realization  of  the  concept  of 
portability of the control system to other plat-
forms, how can the system ever be ever dis-
proved?  This is a fantastic field for life-after-
death theorists. 
Figure 5: A system with self-reference tends to pursue higher level satisfactions when it develops up to  
a point where modeled satisfactions could become difficult or impossible to proof. 
 2.8  Free Will
The question of free will is often discussed 
as a contradiction to deterministic and sponta-
neous models of mind. However, in context of 
the here proposed model there seems to exist 
no such contradiction. 
Assuming that the overall modeling process 
follows  a  mantling  process  as  has  been  de-
scribed by Lodwich in [3], the policies stored 
in the system are encapsulated in several au-
tonomous layers. At its core are unconditional 
policies which in humans we sometimes call 
values. The result of this mantling process is 
that all internal drivers and main policies are 
protected against influence from outside. I hy-
pothesize  that  this  helps  to  organize  the 
fastest satisfaction of needs which can occur 
concurrently and can only be satisfied in se-
quence. 
The term free will simply describes the fact 
that autonomous systems contain difficult  to 
influence internal processes and their policies. 
This definition of free will is absolutely com-
patible with legal or moral theories and does 
not entail any need for metaphysical proper-
ties of the system. For example, the  free will 
in making contracts indicates a very high au-
thorization within the system. In moral con-
texts, free will captures the idea that harmful, 
immoral behavior is not explained as evasive 
behaviors induced by external systems (situa-
tional conditions) but is controlled and moti-
vated from the inside. Hence it requires an in-
tensive feedback signal to the system (that is 
punishment) in order to achieve modification 
of the responsible system's policies closer to 
its autonomy core. 
 2.9  Development of 
Consciousness
Creation  and  maintenance  of  certain  sys-
tems are two distinct kinds of question. In this 
sub-chapter I would like to sketch the process 
of concept formation that would be usable as 
self-reference.  Since  this  paper  is  systemic, 
the choice of any particular formalism is arbi-
trary but I am indeed inclined to using graphi-
cal  and probabilistic  models.  It  is  clear  that 
models  are  systems  which  have  a  defined, 
predictable relationship to more complex sys-
tems. This can be exploited to predict major 
features and developments of the more com-
plex  system.  In  fact,  any  practical  robot  or 
technical system is using a broad range of for-
malism to do the modeling. I say that in order 
to avoid any discrimination of modeling tech-
nology as the exact  choice of technology is 
relatively irrelevant to the processes described 
in this paper. Models of equivalent power can 
be symbolic, neural, graphic or probabilistic. 
However, some formalisms may be biased to-
wards particular problem areas, that's all. 
Figures 6 and 7 explain the process of self-
causation using a  graphic  model.  The mini-
model  consists  of  few nodes, arcs and node 
activations. 
Figure  6 shows two cluster representatives 
(reliable  and  unreliable)  used  to  categorize 
observations. Reliability could be also a prop-
erty which is used to move observed entities 
between different  value  intervals.  There  are 
many ways to implement this. The only im-
portant idea here is that it is relatively straight 
forward to assume that a system with self-dis-
covery capability will use such built-in prop-
erties in order to classify resource reliability. 
In  figure  6 this  is  represented  with  link-
strength  and  could  be  implemented  using 
some adaptive resonance algorithms. 
Figure  7 shows a  development  over  three 
recorded observations which contain the same 
graph but  with different  linkage and activa-
tions. 
The story develops by first activating a need 
entity  that  has  already  been  identified  as  a 
permanent resource with various activations. 
A second entity exists which is the solving re-
source – a satisfier. The model does not know 
whether the satisfier is related to need in the 
first place. 
At some point the action generating engine 
causes an event that is recorded as the activa-
tion of the solving resource and this activation 
occurred only after the need entity was acti-
vated. Moreover the activation of the satisfier 
is followed by the deactivation of the need. 
Now, the modeler can create or modify sev-
eral  connections  from  this  event:  Firstly,  it 
will model a good transition between the need 
resource and the solver resource. Secondly, it 
will model that the reliable components cause 
the particular solving resource to be activated 
and that reliable components cause activation 
of  unreliable  components.  Several  such  sto-
ries more and the model  should look like a 
star where need resources are heavily linked 
to  built-in  reliability  quantifiers  and  form a 
star-shaped connectivity to other less reliable 
entities in the model. All activations start  in 
the  core  area  of  the  model  and  iterate  out-
wards towards solver resources. 
Let  us  further  assume  that  a  system  de-
signed  to  satisfy  drives  will  mainly  model 
events concerned with their satisfaction. Nat-
urally, it will try to use historical data in order 
to find out how needs had been satisfied. The 
plausibility of this approach has been studied 
by  Dörner  who  investigated  memory-based 
modeling techniques for his PSI agents [11]. 
The transition probabilities5 are the ground 
for "causation". The "I" model is at the begin-
ning of most chunked stories related to fulfill-
ment  of  reported  needs.  Needs  and  predic-
tions seem to cause satisfactions (cf. figure 8). 
This enforces the procedure and the separa-
tion into a reliable "I" model (which stands at 
the beginning of relevant sequences) and less 
reliable external resources which act as satis-
fiers (cf. figure 8).
In  this  process  I  assume  that  component 
models  objectively  belonging  to  the  system 
will  be  purified  into  this  self-model  as  is 
shown in figure 9 - a purifying lava lamp.
5 Here  I  have  chosen  to  use  a  concept  from 
probability  theory  but  any  other  formalism, 
like e.g. graphic or field theoretic, is suitable 
to model the more general idea of  preference  
of development. 
 

 3  Cross­Reference To 
Conscious Functions
I would like to localize the proposition in 
terms of the nine categories of conscious op-
eration as were defined by Baars [12] in order 
to clarify which observations the model could 
generate.
 3.1  Definitional and Context­
setting Function
The here proposed model is based on recur-
sively recurrent modeling. The system to be 
considered is not knowing a priori its bound-
aries and in it there is no concealed area of the 
system that would be not observable – this in-
cludes  certain  mechanistic  states.  This  will 
lead to creation of behavior and configuration 
controlling models which can be exploited af-
ter  “external”  or  “internal”  events;  but  the 
system requires only a single mechanism to 
do so.
 3.2  Adaptation and Learning 
Function
The synchronizing and optimizing expecta-
tion maximization algorithm concept, as was 
shown in figure  4, is permanently modeling 
and  measuring  effectiveness  of  actions  by 
making predictions.  The rather  generic  self-
discovery  mechanisms  must  be  guided  by 
some very technical properties like reliability 
speed or bandwidth of components. If a con-
sciousness-enabled system starts condensing, 
i.e.  aggregating  self-concepts  around  these 
properties,  the system will  accidentally start 
to channel the spontaneous optimization fea-
tures around the self-concept.  This will  lead 
to  the  observation that  consciousness  seems 
to be involved in adaptation and learning be-
haviors of the system but also to the strange 
effect that it is very difficult to tell the system 
to learn upon command.
 3.3  Editing, Flagging and 
Debugging Function
Since models by themselves do not  imply 
action  there  is  always  an  element  in  active 
systems to drive them. For example,  an au-
tomaton  could  be  transiting  spontaneously. 
The  automaton  model  is  fairly  simple  and 
might require no more than some probability 
attached to the transitions. Time-less models 
can be structural  – in that  case markers are 
used in order to define a field of attraction or 
deterrence for the system. Such fields guide 
then application of formal rules, e.g. the solv-
ing  of  an  equation  (a  cognitively  complex 
process).  Those  controlling  driver  mecha-
nisms are most intensively amalgamated with 
models related to the system itself. 
When  we  speak  of  function,  we  do  not 
mean a directed mapping between two sets as 
is in a mathematical sense, but a particular or-
dered  sequence  of  mappings  or  family  of 
mappings  (a  behavior)  -  which  are  under 
some circumstances  expressible  as  a  single, 
static mathematical function. 
Creation  and  maintenance  of  these  se-
quences is the natural purpose of the synchro-
nizing  EM-loop.  If  the  conscious  system is 
equipped  with simulative reasoning capabili-
ties then it  is  quite likely that the modeling 
and observation features of the system cover 
activities related to this. It will hence observe 
how the simulative system activates concepts 
during  its  backtracking  operations.  In  fact, 
even  in  own  perception,  I  cannot  say  this 
process  appears  self-controlled to  me – one 
feels  more  like  a  spectator  and  whenever  I 
feel  tired  or  have  more  fundamental  needs, 
the process of problem solving does not con-
tinue anymore. Notwithstanding higher needs, 
it is undoubted that internal simulations help 
to prepare a policy for achieving a new goal 
and to reduce risk associated with the explo-
ration of a solution.
But here is the thing, since the backtracking 
algorithm is finding solutions and the model 
could predict that simulation activities lead to 
an observation class “solution” then it could 
very well conclude that the fast activities ob-
served and associated with the self-model are 
causing  solutions.  This  could  erroneously 
mislead into believing that  this  is  a process 
determined by the self-model  despite that  it 
has been spontaneous all the time, simply be-
cause it was guided by the same driver mech-
anisms  which  are  associated  with  the  self-
model. Indeed, on the outside of the system, it 
is  correct  to  say  that  internal  backtracking 
(debugging,  editing  or  flagging)  did  occur. 
The modeling error becomes irrelevant on the 
outside of the system. 
 3.4  Recruiting and Control 
Function
Since this paper did not cover the exact re-
alization and interactions between models, ac-
tions  and simulations,  only  a  brief,  abstract 
mention is possible here: I did not talk about 
the reasoning engine's internal structure as it 
has not been relevant for observing the sys-
temic process of creating autonomy support-
ing consciousness  in  systems with auto-dis-
covery capabilities. However, it should not be 
difficult to imagine how a look-ahead simula-
tion  could  be  used  to  make  various  predic-
tions for measuring action efficacy. If a simu-
lation did find a relatively complete sequence 
of activities ending in potential  satisfactions 
then  it  could  be  somehow  spontaneously 
scheduled for execution. 
However,  since  the  activation  of  satisfac-
tions follows the activation of needs associ-
ated with the self-model with a fair reliability 
and because physical activities follow a reso-
nant state in the simulative part with a fair re-
liability, the system must conclude and model 
that  the  self-model  section  is  causing  the 
scheduling of activities. Again, this is a mod-
eling  mistake  if  transition  probabilities  are 
used  to  model  causation  because  the  self-
model  does  not  cause  this  sequence.  How-
ever, again, on the outside of the system there 
is no way to tell the difference.
 3.5  Prioritizing and Access 
Control Functions
There are two parts to this idea: One is that 
of action prioritization and the second one is 
access control. The first point is relatively ob-
vious,  it  is  about  the  action  selection  and 
scheduling  process  as  has  been  sketched in 
chapter 3.4. It needs only be theoretically ex-
panded in the way that current activity sched-
uled for execution has some kind of priority 
attached to it which it derives from the satis-
factions found in it. If a newer prediction did 
arrive  with  higher  satisfaction  then  it  could 
flush the current sequence and replace it with 
a more satisfactory program. In this process 
self-models and related modeling misconclu-
sions would be extended by the concept that 
the self-model is causing these flushes (prori-
tizations). 
Since the presented system does not know 
its  boundaries  and applies  the  same mecha-
nisms inside and outside of its true physical 
boundaries,  the  system  can  observe  and 
model  causation  between  inactive  and  acti-
vated classes of model concepts. This would 
lead to the misconception that the system is 
causing and guarding the activation of these 
concepts  despite  that  the  whole  process  is 
spontaneous.
 3.6  Decision­Making or Executive  
Function
Given what we have learned in sections 3.4 
and 3.5 nothing new is to say in terms of the 
role  consciousness  plays  in  it.  While  3.4 is 
more focusing on motor functions, indeed the 
system never knows or makes any difference 
between manipulation of internal resources or 
external resources. We can speak of internal 
motors which keep progressing activation and 
reconfiguration of  executable  models.  How-
ever,  the  system does  not  know how many 
layers of control it has or its environment. It 
is simply promoting states in every layer of 
behavior control that it has modeled. So it can 
be that one mental train of action gets sched-
uled to run on internal resources and that an-
other  train of  actions  gets  scheduled on the 
most concrete level of resources, the true and 
physical  sensorimotor surface (cf.  figure  8), 
The mechanics can be the same but we do not 
get notice of this until visible events start to 
unfold for  external  observers.  This  is  either 
when  we receive  acoustic  vibrations  or  ob-
serve coarse mechanic operations. We like to 
speak of a “decision” if a flush has occurred 
in a higher level model of which ripples have 
reached the outskirts of phonetic motors or of 
“recruiting” when we observe flushes on ma-
jor motor controls. 
 3.7  Analogy­Forming Function
The here proposed models rely on recursive 
modeling resulting in creation of an arbitrary 
amount of nested control – very much like it 
has been proposed by Dörner  [11] with Psi. 
For this theory one technical reference is the 
implementation from OpenCog6.  This model 
discovers an arbitrary amount of stories and 
meta-stories which can be used for behavior 
control.
What is different is the way resources are 
provided  to  the  different  levels  of  program 
execution. While real motor control levels de-
serve  several  dedicated  execution  resources 
right from the start in order to guarantee real-
time properties of the system, such resources 
are not guaranteed to higher levels of control 
where the system might have to abuse a cer-
tain  general  purpose  resource  to  execute 
them. So, you would expect that a system ca-
pable  of  arbitrary  depth  modeling  will  run 
into  a  technical  resource  problem  which  it 
will try to fix by time-sharing a single predic-
tion  and  action  backtracking  engine.  This 
could explain why activities  related to  con-
sciousness appear to be jumping between pro-
grams and simulations related to different lev-
els of abstraction and why it seems to relate 
content  of  various  grades  of  abstraction  to 
each other in that particular place (“forming 
of analogies”). I can only speculate that neu-
ral flexibility allows production of additional 
dedicated  resources  if  certain  functions  are 
frequently  needed  (equivalent  to  an  FPGA 
compiler) in order to make them faster. This 
could again explain performance differences 
between experts and novices.
 3.8  Metacognitive or Self­
monitoring Function
I  have  shown in  figure  4 that  monitoring 
performance is a basic element for successful 
adaptation  and  correction  of  executed  poli-
cies. If the involved modeling is based on re-
current  observation of activations (modeling 
of activations of models) then the system can-
not but have metacognitive and self-monitor-
ing functions. If partial models related to own 
system can be aggregated as conditional ex-
6 http://www.artificialbrains.com/opencog
pressions  of  more  abstract  system  models 
then this will result in various fall-back simu-
lations  if  predictions  start  to  deteriorate  in 
their  concrete  expressions.  Only  very  basic 
engineering techniques are needed for doing 
this. 
Figure  10 shows how the envisaged model 
should  behave  when  problems  are  detected 
during  execution  of  cognitive  programs  – 
strains of activity produced by the reasoning 
engine. Transferring main load of activity be-
tween concrete execution models and the next 
more abstract levels would be equivalent with 
the notion of self-monitoring (when relying to 
fixing or restoring a configuration) and meta-
cognition (when relating to modeling and re-
detecting patterns).
Clearly,  these  processes  are  controlled  by 
species-specific parameters and resources but 
the system will  eventually conclude that the 
self-model  is  causing  these  transitions.  This 
can be again explained with robust sequences 
of activations between internal activations: A 
problem occurring on the right side is prolif-
erated up if simulations yield no satisfactory 
solution. This will engage more abstract and 
more generic simulations which can be used 
in  taking  the  more  concrete  resources  “by 
hand”. They would auto-fill missing parts by 
association. In that case activations in models 
on the left  side would predate activation on 
the right side. Moreover, it would detect that 
again  model  elements  strongly  attributed  to 
drivers  are  predating  activation  of  models 
which are not connected to them. If the sys-
tem  models  the  temporal  relationships  be-
tween activities  observed in  the  two groups 
(in a possibly yet more abstract group of con-
cepts) then the system would more or less jus-
tifiably conclude that the various self-models 
in  a  specific  level  (cf.  figure  3)  have  been 
causing the problem fixing in lower levels de-
spite that all of the function was spontaneous.
 3.9  Autoprogramming and Self­
maintenance Function
The  terms  programming and  maintenance 
are more complex activities then the ones de-
scribed hitherto. It could require all the capa-
bilities mentioned above. 
Programming  requires  some  kind  of  con-
cept  to  be  implemented.  This  requires  a 
source and a target with resources to execute 
the program. An explanation of such behavior 
could  be  found  in  figure  10 as  was  com-
mented  in  section  3.8.  However,  no  matter 
which basic mechanism of impasse fixing is 
chosen, if it works then it will leave well pre-
dictable  sequences  of  activations  which  can 
be abused to deduce causality. 
Self-maintenance  is  a  different  story  but 
also very complex process  related to  strong 
degrees of autonomy of systems. It  will  ex-
ploit some or all above mentioned features in 
order  to  protect  core  policies.  All  models 
which are acquired by the system with auto-
discovery capabilities guide and channel  the 
process  of  fixing  the  impasses.  Since  this 
process greatly relies on drivers and markers 
and the like, a very important class of models 
involved in  the  channeling will  be  the  self-
models  which are  standing at  the beginning 
and the end of most interesting causal chains. 
From this the system can reverse-conclude ac-
tivities for maintenance in a spontaneous way 
but  the  resulting  activation  of  concepts  and 
generation of observations will propose noth-
ing else than the self-model has caused activi-
ties  related  to  maintenance  in  a  magically 
spontaneous  way  –  the  magical  free  will – 
which, in fact, is not so magical at all because 
indeed all  the involved processes have been 
spontaneous so far.
 4  Practical 
Considerations
 4.1  Why is it so hard to achieve 
Strong Consciousness?
Engineers design tools and technical prod-
ucts in order to overcome certain weaknesses 
of the human worker while keeping them un-
der his firm control. Engineering best practice 
demands isolation of components and narrow, 
well  predictable  communication  between 
components  via  interfaces.  In  systems  with 
self-discovery  and  self-configuration,  com-
munication layout is based on hard to control 
components  resonance.  This  makes  systems 
more resilient but is also at odds with tradi-
tional  maintenance  practice  and  business 
models. Imagine selling a product for which 
you cannot properly define its qualities.
Moreover, engineered components  are  im-
plemented  in  higher  level  non-interoperable 
formalisms  where  establishing  reasonable 
data exchange is difficult,  even if introspec-
tion was provided. 
 4.2  Detection and Measuring of 
Consciousness
Detection of consciousness in a pure obser-
vatory way is relying on proper emission and 
recognition of signals.  External systems try-
ing to detect consciousness try to find out if 
they can identify a satisfactorily stable repre-
 
 
sentation of self-reference emitted by the ob-
served system.
This signal of self-reference (address or ID) 
is technically useful  for external systems. If 
they can emit references to conscious systems 
in communications then they can eventually 
by-pass  slow interpretation activities  of  that 
party. This would result in faster synchroniza-
tion of systems in case of collaboration. 
Modeling of differences in  synchronization 
efficiency between situations where self-refer-
ence was emitted and situations where self-
reference was not emitted leads to conclusion 
that  self-reference  and  corresponding  con-
sciousness  is  indeed  relevant  for  technical 
performance and hence real.
Without  the  presumption  of  human-like 
consciousness,  recognition  of  consciousness 
is very difficult to perform. Most of what sys-
tems  do  is  spontaneous  because  that's  the 
technically ideal state, the most efficient way 
to interact with the environment. The need to 
access  deeper  internal  models  must  be  ac-
tively provoked because it costs additional en-
ergy. In  general  this  is  done by creating an 
impasse  where  the  system  must  not  only 
change  behavior  but  invent  a  new behavior 
program never observed from it before. This 
will require a real use of internal models. Yet 
still,  let  us assume, we are successful  at in-
voking new behaviors. These new behaviors 
come in two main flavors: 
• Situations where model of self is ir-
relevant: they prove nothing 
• Situation where model of self is deci-
sive in outcome: 
◦ clearly  self-motivated  decisions 
prove conscious capabilities
◦ Decisions  not  clearly  self-moti-
vated prove nothing because
▪ a system can also be simply 
not  efficient  enough  in  a 
given situation (e.g. system is 
overwhelmed or does not yet 
have  enough  competence 
with environment)
▪ a system can be lacking con-
sciousness 
It  means  that  the  difficulty  to  prove  con-
sciousness lies in the ability to provoke a new 
kind of response that would demonstrate ac-
cess  to  self-models  used  for  favoring  own 
benefits  while  not  stressing  its  competence 
envelope too much.  
In order to demonstrate the difficulty let us 
of think of the attempt to prove that children 
have consciousness. Children have conscious-
ness as of few months age but because of low 
competence levels they cannot be tested for 
consciousness upon the grounds what would 
be the best decision in their self-interest. By 
adult standards, they would fail the above test 
mostly all of the time. Only specialized tests 
adapted to low competence levels of a small 
child can verify their consciousness and their 
growing autonomy. 
Since machines lack human bodies and be-
cause their competence is often fairly low by 
adult  standards  and  because  they  are  often 
used in standard situations, this all surmounts 
to a huge difficulty to establish machine con-
sciousness from observation. For that reason 
structural arguments are necessary for techni-
cal systems. The best solution would be if we 
could basically make several checks on a list 
and say after  that:  "Ok, the system has this 
and that component,  they have this and that 
capability  and  those  are  wired  up  like  this, 
then yepp, it will exhibit conscious features!" 
And this is what the engineer needs to know 
in order to avoid it. 
 5  Strategies for avoiding 
Strong Consciousness
Now, with some understanding how strong 
consciousness could get created we can con-
sider  several  strategies  to  interrupt  its  cre-
ation. We can have a look at figure  4 again 
and identify several means to interrupt strong 
consciousness formation:
Condensation: A key component in creat-
ing  a  distinct  entity  to  be  referenced is  the 
condensation property. If model elements are 
described in terms that have no systemic rele-
vance to the system (e.g. cost in units of cur-
rency) then models will  not start  to conden-
sate into a system representation.  With con-
densation I  mean the process  of  associating 
partial models to form a larger, conditionally 
expressible model of the system. 
Recursion:  A  technical  system  has  very 
rarely the need to model internal and external 
observations recursively. Most robot designs 
define explicit layers of abstractions in order 
to guarantee optimal APIs for controlling the 
robot. However, this could be too little to pre-
vent strong consciousness. For example, if a 
system is designed with very abstract models 
like  objects,  observations,  predictions,  etc. 
right from the start then it could start to rea-
son about it and could derive a causation hy-
pothesis  between a  self-model  and  observa-
tions.
Causation: Limit scope in which causation 
is modeled or exploited by reasoning engines. 
Drives: A key driver of modeling self-refer-
ence is the presence of driver satisfactions in 
observations of relevance. If systems do not 
own drives related to system autonomy then 
system will  not exhibit  self-favorable strate-
gies.
Knowledge Integrity: Current engineering 
practice is minimizing knowledge integrity by 
encapsulating it in functionally large compo-
nents which do not offer a lot of opportunity 
for  re-configuration  by  a  superordinate  sys-
tem. Since strong consciousness' purpose is to 
organize  systems'  re-configurations  there  is 
not  much  potential  to  develop  strong  con-
sciousness if there is little to configure. 
 6  Conclusions 
 6.1  Ethical Motivations
According to Sanz [13], there are three mo-
tivations to pursue artificial consciousness:
• implementing  and  designing  ma-
chines resembling human beings 
• understanding  the  nature  of  con-
sciousness 
• implementing  and  designing  more 
efficient control systems. 
I believe that motive #1 is of questionable 
value but, indeed, replication of humans into 
all  possible  technical  domains  (which  in-
cludes computers) is the natural expression of 
our  autonomy,  resulting  in  desire  to  create 
copies  of  ourself  which  would  survive  new 
kinds  of  conditions  (e.g.  space  flight).  Cre-
ation of such technical humanoids would pose 
many challenges to our societies, for example 
because such agents would be potentially im-
mortal  or  because  they  would  deny  owner-
ship.
Motive #2 is legitimate. We should under-
stand  creation  of  consciousness  in  order  to 
better  deal  with unusual  states  of  mind and 
how to treat them. 
Motive  #3  is  of  questionable  value.  Con-
scious modeling is not efficient form of con-
trol. Due to modeling and self-observation it 
requires  tremendous  amounts  of  memory 
even if tasks are relatively simple. Conscious 
systems expand their internal complexity over 
time. Customers want "simple" products - that 
is products which they can understand out of 
the box and do not require much modeling on 
their  side.  Strong  consciousness  and  auton-
omy is clearly geared against such goals. 
As a consequence, engineers engaged with 
product  development  will  avoid  implement-
ing features of consciousness as much as pos-
sible.  In  advanced  applications,  where  sys-
tems need some autonomy, engineers will se-
lectively add modeling capabilities and limit 
the level of model recursion. 
In  conscious  systems,  which  are  special 
subcategory of  autonomous  systems,  central 
motivators  are  not  only  self-protective  but 
also not directly related to any acquired spe-
cific capability, making them mostly useless 
as anchors for exerting control over such sys-
tems as would be required for tools. 
 6.2  Systemic, Emergent 
Consciousness
I attempted to create an ethically motivated 
argument why creation of strongly conscious 
machines  should  be  avoided.  Unfortunately, 
in modern technical systems it is not possible 
to  avoid  systems  with  various  recursive  or 
adaptive features, anymore. 
In order to better understand which condi-
tions will lead to strong consciousness I have 
laid out the conditions leading to its creation: 
(Strong)  Consciousness  is  the  effect  of  a 
white-box  recursive  resource  discovery 
process in combination with the process for 
modeling their performance which is key pre-
disposition to successful operation in uncon-
strained environments. 
Since this process is best described as au-
topoietic (laying itself out), creation of stable 
and functionally useful self-reference (decla-
ration of pointer to a configuration of the sta-
ble  resources)  is  among  the  first  things  to 
happen. Therefore you should be able to de-
tect conscious features among the first proper-
ties of a system which is systemically enabled 
to produce consciousness.
In summary, the model suggests:
• System concludes that it is acting
• System expands autonomy over time
• System identifies an internal  agency 
inside itself which could be indepen-
dent of the physical platform
Furthermore I am proposing that conscious-
ness  is  a  systemic  property  and  can  be 
achieved by basically any formalism, be this 
logic,  linear  algebra,  probabilistic  reasoning 
and so on. Choosing a different technology of 
model implementation will not reduce risks of 
sparking system autonomy or consciousness. 
 6.3  Alternative Models
The here laid out proposition is competing 
with discrete approaches as are occasionally 
proposed in artificial cognitive sciences. For 
example,  Starzyk and Prasad  [14] create  an 
architecture  with  dedicated  components  to 
create  features  of  consciousness.  In  contrast 
to such architectures,  my explanation model 
does not require built-in or dedicated compo-
nents  for  self-models,  motives,  emotions  or 
monitoring.  The  natural  elements  of  the 
model are activations, policies, recurrent and 
recursive modeling and some basic systemic 
optimization  properties  as  reliability,  delay 
times, filter spectrum or bandwidth. This ap-
proach is motivated by a systemic notion of 
autonomy [3] and should stretch from organic 
over technical up to social machines.
A general purpose algorithmic implementa-
tion of such model would – in theory – allow 
spawning a fully autonomous and conscious 
control  system for  any  physical  system but 
the obstacles to it are a reasonably universal 
modeling  formalism  -  something  for  future 
work to show what  this  could be.  If  it  was 
possible  then  a  new  study  of  species  opti-
mization  would  emerge  either  trying  to  re-
strict the regular amount of autonomy or im-
proving technical performance for a particular 
“ecological  niche”.  However,  this  process 
would be accompanied by a problematic per-
sonization of the systems in legal and ethical 
sense.
For all other purposes, a systemic theory for 
understanding the creation of strongly autono-
mous features including consciousness in an 
evolutionary  fashion  seems  necessary  as  it 
would have a high explanatory power -  but 
will require reference to very basic technolog-
ical concepts, such a ordering, activation, res-
onance and the like. Motives, emotions, men-
tal self-models, monitoring, working memory, 
self-programming  and  many  more  must  be 
explained in those terms in such a theory. 
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